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Abstract
Professor Miller summons us to consider the constitutionality of
nuclear weapons. In doing so, he has made an original, provocative contribution
to constitutional jurisprudence as well as the humanizing
politics of nuclear arms control. He speaks with scholarly responsibility
on a subject that has heretofore engendered either silence or nonsense
and bombast.
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Nuclear War: The End of Law
Milner S. Ball*
Professor Miller summons us to consider the constitutionality of
nuclear weapons. In doing so, he has made an original, provocative con-
tribution to constitutional jurisprudence as well as the humanizing
politics of nuclear arms control. He speaks with scholarly responsibility
on a subject that has heretofore engendered either silence or nonsense
and bombast.
Introduction
By raising the question about the constitutionality of nuclear
weapons, Professor Miller augments understanding of constitutional
law and how constitutional law is done. Constitutional lawyers take far
too crabbed a view of their subject when they merely sift through past
court decisions and speculate on how the Supreme Court might decide
a case in future. Consideration of the legality of nuclear arms leads
Professor Miller to point out that the constitution is not limited to what
the Court has said or may say. It includes, he reminds us, the great
political realities which are brought partially to textual expression in
the preamble and which can be fully satisfied not by judicial opinions
but only by the people's decisions and actions and by the operations of
all our institutions. To begin with, then, nuclear war violates constitu-
tional law in the Miller dimension, which embraces systemic justice
and the fundamental nature of government by the people.'
Equally enlarging is Professor Miller's introduction of arguments
drawn from specific constitutional provisions. First he exhumes and
gives life to the doctrine of delegation, not presently favored in federal
* Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law
1. It is to be remembered that Abraham Lincoln characteristically referred to
the Declaration of Independence rather than to the Constitution when he addressed the
fundamental nature of the American people.
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litigation and not before given such expansive, refreshing expression. 2
Article 1, section 8, clause 2 commits to Congress the power to declare
war. Presidents, acting without such congressional declarations have,
from time to time, authorized responsive, limited military action. Pro-
fessor Miller proposes that, because limits cannot be maintained once
nuclear weapons are employed, Congress may not delegate decisions
about their use to the President or to computers and glitsches.3
Second, having called attention to the restrictions of delegation,
Professor Miller takes note o'f its responsibilities. Congress may not fail
to exercise the powers delegated to it by the constitution. Article I,
section 8, clause 10 grants to Congress the power to punish offenses
against the law of nations. Accordingly, says Professor Miller, Con-
gress must combat the international crime of threatened or contem-
plated use of nuclear weapons.4
Third, the President has an affirmative constitutional duty similar
to that imposed upon Congress. Article II, section 3 directs the chief
executive to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed." The word
"laws" comprehends international law by implication, analogy or ne-
cessity, and so places the President under a duty matching that of Con-
gress. He, too, must act. to remove the forbidden threat of nuclear
2. Pre-1937 decisions of the Supreme Court occasionally relied upon the doctrine
of non-delegation of legislative powers in striking down actions of Congress. See, e.g.,
A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935). More re-
cently, the Court has avoided invocation of the doctrine by the device of narrow con-
struction of a tested delegation. See, e.g., Federal Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG,
Inc., 426 U.S. 548 (1976). For a judicial expression of interest in resurrecting the doc-
trine see Industrial Union v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980). The
doctrine of non-delegation has found a readier audience in state courts where it appears
to be alive and well. See, e.g., Howell v. State, 238 Ga. 95, 230 S.E.2d 853 (1976).
3. There is a prior question here about whether Congress itself has the power to
declare nuclear war. See infra p. 61. If war ever had a human scale, that possibility has
grown increasingly remote since the beginning of World War I when technology was
let loose relentlessly to grind human life and human flesh.
4. I have reservations about this argument. It may be that legislatures are
designed, mercifully, exactly to do nothing. See, e.g., R. NEELY, How COURTS Gov-
ERN AMERICA 47-78 (1981). Perhaps the only affirmative duty of Congress that we
may safely press is that of the oath of office to support the Constitution (art. VI, § 3).
To cite but one example, I think it best that the congressional power to declare war not
be viewed as carrying with it an affirmative duty. We want no zealous exercises of that
power.
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arms.5
Last, Professor Miller argues that the due process clause places
upon all three branches the requirement actively to prevent nuclear
deprivation of life, liberty and property.6 He then ends as he began: he
challenges lawyers to take up the problem of nuclear weapons because
it is a matter of law for lawyers, not some distant activity above and
beyond the calling of the bar.
The Constitutional Aspects of Nuclear Weapons
If my views diverge from Professor Miller's at certain points, the
variance should not be misinterpreted. I wish to pay tribute to him and
to do so by heeding his call to speak. How better to express thanks than
to do exactly as he urges and take up the debate?
Professor Miller offers his essay as a preliminary exploration of
possibilities. My response is in kind. I want to raise some questions
about the agenda for discussion of the constitutionality of nuclear
weapons.
5. This argument has several steps. There must be an affirmative duty; interna-
tional law must be included in this duty; nuclear weapons must be a violation of inter-
national law; the Court must have power to declare the duty. I do not think the argu-
ment unworthy of pursuit. But each of its elements will have to be established, and I do
not think that an easy task.
6. Such a federal police power might be seen as having two components: an af-
firmative duty abroad to labor for mutual disarmament and a domestic self-policing
duty not to do those things which may trigger nuclear war.
Perhaps the growing interest in an expansion of the public trust doctrine might
afford a preferred ground upon which to build the desired affirmative duty.
It is also to be asked if the affirmative duty of government might not include some
form of unilateral disarmament. Professor Miller says that his essay is not a plea for
selective unilateral disarmament. I would like at least to reserve judgment on the issue
of unilateral disarmament. On the one hand, I can imagine a type of selective unilat-
eral disarmament that might be plain, good military policy and actually strengthen our
defense posture. On the other hand, as Professor Miller points out, ideas may appear
foolish only because they are new and challenge received ways of thinking. Miller,
Nuclear Weapons and Constitutional Law, 7 NOVA L.J. 21 (1982).
1I :1 8
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A. Unconstitutional: Is the Characterization of Nuclear Weap-
ons as Constitutional Adequate?
Fear and befuddlement prevent action. If we are so afraid of the
bomb that we suffer ethical paralysis or are so overwhelmed by the
claimed complexities of disarmament that we cannot grasp them, then
the arms race will run on toward the finish of nuclear apocalypse. Pro-
fessor Miller cuts the dragon down to size. He gives us hope. He shows
us that we can take action, can process the dragon into links of sau-
sage. This is a very lawyerlike approach. It encourages lawyers to un-
derstand that nuclear war is something that they can and should pre-
vent. We are enabled to subject the bomb to arguments about
constitutional validity the way lawyers reduce any volatile issue to
manageable parts bearing blackletter labels.
This is a good and commendable undertaking. Nevertheless there
is considerable risk in initiating a dialogue about the legality of nuclear
arms. Lawyers suffer a vocational disadvantage in this regard not
shared by their colleagues in the medical profession. When a physician
describes the effects of a nuclear attack - massive death, mutilated
bodies, unbearable suffering, endless contamination - we are horror
struck.7 None but a madman would argue that nuclear war is healthy.
7. Physicians are as diverse in their political and social views as any other
large group of citizens and rarely speak in unison on matters of public
policy. But today they are virtually united in their effort to convey a sim-
ple, urgent message about nuclear war to the American public and the
Administration. The message is this: Nuclear war-any kind bf nuclear
war-would cause death and suffering on a scale never seen before in all
of history, and modern medicine with all its skills could do little or nothing
to help ...
Most physicians are convinced that nuclear war is the greatest threat to
health and survival that society has ever faced. It would indeed be the
'final epidemic,' for which medicine has no treatment. When there exists
no cure for a disease, the only course is to take preventive measures. That
is why physicians believe it is their professional responsibility to urge their
fellow citizens and their Government to make certain that nuclear weapons
are never used. Unlike natural catastrophes, over which man has no con-
trol, nuclear war would be a disaster of man's making. It should be
preventable.
Realm & Leaf, Doctors: No Rx's In a War, N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1982, at A23, col.
4
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Not so when our political rather than physical constitution is the sub-
ject. No sooner does one lawyer argue that nuclear weapons are not
constitutional than another lawyer ventures the counter-argument that
they are constitutional.8 Arguments on both sides of any issue are our
professional stock-in-trade. To introduce the subject of nuclear weapons
into such argumentation is to take the chance that this exercise may,
against our deepest wishes, lend nuclear weapons an unwarranted air of
legitimacy.9 Quite apart from any authoritative decision, lawyers' argu-
ments might domesticate the nuclear issue, remove its urgency as well
as its terror, and make it, catastrophically, familiar.
Nuclear weapons are monstrous. They may also be illegal. But we
dare not lose sight of their unnatural monstrocity. Of course lawyers
should address prevention of nuclear war. The assignment is to keep
the blasphemy of nuclear war clearly in focus at the same time that we
find means for lawyers to reckon with it in lawyerlike ways.
Instead of talking about the unconstitutionality of nuclear weap-
ons, would we not be better advised to describe them as deconstitution-
alizing or anti-constitutional?
Professor Miller's own comments - about nuclear war's destruc-
tion of underlying values - indicate how we might proceed. Like doc-
tors we would attempt to depict the aftermath of nuclear war. But,
8. The arguments in favor of constitutionality are easily imaginable: preambular
citation of the need for common defense, Article I delegation of the powers to raise and
support armies and to provide for the common defense, Article II delegation of certain
foreign affairs responsibilities and of command of the armed forces, Articles III limita-
tions of judicial review, etc.
9. Undeniably, nuclear weapons exist. But that certainly does not mean that they
are legitimate. Professor Miller refers to an "assumption of constitutionality" of nu-
clear weapons. Miller, supra note 6, at 22. I am not prepared to make or grant that
assumption.
Secretary of Energy, James B. Edwards, not only assumes the legitimacy of nu-
clear weapons but celebrates them. In an unparalleled display of callousness--or was it
cynicism?-Secretary Edwards said that he found "exciting" a nuclear bomb exploded
on the eve of the anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima. "Cabinet Officer says U.S.
will continue Atom Arms Testing," N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1982, at 1, col. 1. Secretary
Edwards seems to regard nuclear arms as an adjunct of the first amendment: the nu-
clear bomb "is the weapon that can preserve their ability for free political discussion."
Id. at B4, col. 6. It is an alarming point of view and helps to indicate why I wish to
overthrow the ideological statement that we live in a Hobbesian world. See infra note
10.
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instead of taking up the medical consequences, we would address the
legal consequences.
For example: What would become of western legal order? Would
there be a legal system? How would it function? Would there be gov-
ernment? Would there be courts? What of police? What would happen
to the practice of law? Would there be law schools left? What would
legal education become when all the major law schools in major urban
target areas had been destroyed? And what of democratic government?
Is it not likely that any surviving remnant would find abhorrent and
reject our way of life and Constitution that had permitted this thing to
happen?10
These are the kinds of questions that might be taken up and de-
bated if we realized that nuclear weapons are de-constitutionalizing.
We would be asked to portray those things known to us as lawyers that
would be lost. Lawyerly argument would then be stripped of its poten-
tial to legitimate nuclear weapons for the arguments would proceed
from the premise of destruction. The subject for debate would be not
whether nuclear weapons are legal, but rather, the extent to which they
destroy law and lawyers.
10. Professor Miller says that we live in a Hobbesian world. Miller, supra note 6,
at 24. I disagree for two reasons. First, a Hobbesian world is what we would have after
nuclear war. Hobbes' account is sobering:
In such condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof
is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor
use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodius build-
ing; no instruments of moving, and removing, such things as require much
force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts;
no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger
of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and
short.
T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 100 (M. Oakeshott ed. 1962). That is a pretty fair description
of a post-nuclear war world, not the one we have now, and it serves to help us under-
stand what we would lose.
The second reason for disagreeing with the statement that we live in a Hobbesian
world is this: We are made to believe that we live in a Hobbesian world through propa-
ganda and ideology, and it is a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. We need desperately to
find a more satisfactory description for reality, one that would not lead us to accept as
rational the self-contradictory statement that we must have nuclear arms if we are to
survive.
6
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B. Decision-Makers: The Nuclear Problem as an Opportunity
for Popular Revolution.
Professor Miller, with his strategy of hope, points out that nuclear
weapons present us with an opportunity. He makes of them an opportu-
nity for broadening and deepening our conception of constitutional ju-
risprudence and for heightening our sense of legal ethics. May there
not be another opportunity in the making, opportunity for a kind of
positive democratic revolution?
Thomas Jefferson had thought that liberty in America might be
enriched by a revolution every generation. Nuclear arms may provide
occasion for this generation's revolution if the growing disarmament
movement among the people continues.'
Professor Miller makes reference to those who have authority and
control in the government and their duty to take action. And he says
that lawyers are no longer on the sidelines because they have quasi-
governmental status and a share in the action. This is to accept the fact
of government by an elite and to say that lawyers have some attach-
ment to that elite.
The problem of truly popular government is one that we have not
solved. We have done a more or less satisfactory job of providing gov-
ernment of and for the people. We do not provide government by the
people. Periodic elections, polls and interest groups are means of bring-
ing influence to bear upon government. They are not a participation in
government. The nearest thing the people have .to a place within gov-
ernment is the street - marches and rallies before the United Nations,
below the Washington monument, etc. The street is not a satisfactory
forum for the formation and expression of opinion.
It is in this sense that nuclear weapons and the people's movement
to control them offers a governmental opportunity, the opportunity to
think about and explore government by the people.
President Eisenhower pointed to the gap between what the govern-
ment is planning and doing and what the people are dreaming and hop-
ing. He said that the people want peace so much that one day govern-
11. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to W. S. Smith (Nov. 13, 1787) in THE PA-
PERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 356-57 (J. Boyd ed. 1955). See also THE LIFE AND SE-
LECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 488, 492, 674-75, 714 (A. Koch & W.
Peden eds. 1944).
591
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ments "had better get out of their way and let them have it."12 We
keep reciting the refrain that in this government the people are sover-
eign. If the people are indeed the governors as well as the governed,
then they and not an elite should be the decision-makers with the duty
to act. Perhaps the issue of nuclear arms control will bring the day for
piercing the veil of rhetoric and reaching the reality of popular govern-
ment. At least we are given the opportunity to consider it.
Lawyers have a critical role to play in the democratic governing of
affairs, especially nuclear affairs. 13 They have this role not because of
ties to a governing elite but because of their original ties to the people.
If we have governmental status with responsibility to act, then this is so
because as officers of the court we have a singular duty in generally-
shared citizenship.
With respect to the nuclear disarmament opportunity, lawyers
might wish to reflect upon and develop juridical means for giving ex-
pression to what the people are dreaming and hoping. We might also
wish to consider whether conceptions of how to train lawyers in the
skills of representation have been too narrowly confined. Legal repre-
sentation of the people may entail something altogether different from
(and in addition to) courtroom advocacy, negotiation, drafting, etc.
Would this be subject matter for a professional skills course? Constitu-
tional law? Some other? As a minimum, lawyers ought to be asked to
devise, for a matter as urgent and immediate as nuclear war, a more
efficacious mode of participation than polls, litigation, demonstrations,
or a letter to one's congressman. (The force of such a letter is fully
spent in triggering a machine-extruded standard-form response bearing
a machine-impressed signature.)
C. Process: Are the Procedures Leading Up To and Resulting
From Nuclear War Constitutional?
Professor Miller observes that constitutionalism in the United
12. D. EISENHOWER, THE QUOTABLE DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 55 (1967); B.
COOK, THE DECLASSIFIED EISENHOWER 149 (1981) (quoting a statement of Eisen-
hower to Harold Macmillan in a televised talk, London (Sept. 6, 1959)).
13. I am a member of the Lawyer's Alliance for Nuclear Arms Control. I do not
represent or speak for this organization. My opinions led me to join this group; my
membership did not lead me to hold these opinions.
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States is more than process, i.e. law has normative content. This may
well be true. But are there not procedural issues yet to be fully
exploited?
(1) If we project the aftermath of a hypothetical nuclear war (as-
suming there would be an aftermath), the barren legal landscape ex-
hibits several procedural features. One of these is the absence of appeal
or recourse.
In Nixon v. Fitzgerald,14 the Supreme Court held that the Presi-
dent is absolutely immune from damage suits for actions taken in con-
nection with official duty. Writing for the Court, Justice Powell averred
that the Court had not placed the President above the law.1 5 He said
that the possibility that the President was above the law was a chilling
but unjustified contention."6 He said that it was unjustified because
there remains the remedy of impeachment. Regardless of what one
thinks about Nixon v. Fitzgerald, it does help us to see the chilling fact
that nuclear war would put the President above the law, and above
politics for that matter. There would be no legal or political redress.
Impeachment would have no materiality or relevance. Elections, if they
were ever held again, would not recall the devastation.
We can see that Congress cannot delegate to the President such an
unlimited power. But then we can also see that Congress cannot exer-
cise this power either. In fact, the real reason that Congress cannot
delegate this power is that it does not have such a power. The essence
of constitutionalism, says Professor Miller is limited government. Arti-
cle I of the Constitution does not contain the grant of unlimited power.
When we committed to Congress the power to declare war, we did not
grant the power to declare Armageddon. There would be no appeal
from such a declaration. We have given neither the President nor the
Congress the right to use unbounded violence or violence without legal
and political control. Self-destruction, if it is a right, is one retained by
the people.
(2) If we start with nuclear war and think back rather than be-
yond, we find other procedural issues. For example, what is the process
14. 50 U.S.L.W. 4797 (U.S. June 24, 1982).
15. Id. at 4804 & n.41.
16. Id. at 4804 n.41.
17. Id. at 4804.
61 1
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by which nuclear war comes about? Research on this subject by consti-
tutional scholars could be divided into two phases: one from the present
back to the origin of the nuclear possibility; the other forward to a
projected hypothetical nuclear war.
With respect to phase one: How has today's situation come to be?
Through what processes was our policy or lack of policy given shape?
What defaults in constitutional process does this history expose? With
respect to phase two: What exactly are the procedures by which nu-
clear war happens? Do these procedures entail nuclear war, or do
faulty procedures allow nuclear strikes to take place in constitutionally
suspect ways? (I hazard the guess that secrecy in these areas - such
as chains of command - has far less legitimate scope than we are led
to suppose.)
(3) If there are procedural arguments and procedural research re-
maining to be pursued, are there not also procedural actions to be con-
sidered? In addition to debating the subject, what ought lawyers do?
What judicial, political or other steps should we take? For a start,
would it not be lawyerlike to press for the procedural device of requir-
ing impact statements detailing the effects of nuclear war and the arms
race upon the environment?
Conclusion
Professor Miller's essay precipitates a final, unresolved thought:
What if nuclear weapons are constitutional and nuclear war is legal?
What might that reveal to us about our constitution? About our legal-
political system? About ourselves? All the answers within range of my
powers of vision appear utterly joyless. Ultimate honesty compels us to
face those answers howsoever bitterly we may rue their content.18
18. Such honesty would be the contemporary form of repentance. As such, it
would not be easily accomplished. One of the difficulties is the way in which people use
God. As George Kennan has noted, during this century's world wars, both sides ap-
pealed to God for support of their military efforts. Kennan, A Christian View of the
Arms Race, THEOLOGY TODAY 162, 170 (July, 1982). Howsoever questionable "this
combination of religious faith and secular chauvinism. . . in those past instances" and
howsoever it may appear that "modern military technology has now created conditions
which allow only one (godly) answer to the possibility of a Soviet-American war," Id. I
believe that history offers every reason to suppose that some people will nevertheless
10
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appeal to God in support of even nuclear arms. There has long been an intimate in-
volvement of religion in both American constitutionalism and warfare. This is neither
the place nor the forum for trying to confront that controversial, complicated involve-
ment. However, these matters are an issue in the question of the constitutionality of
nuclear weapons. Suffice it to say here that the honesty necessary to face the answers to
the questions posed in the text seems to me available only in the context of the biblical
faith. But I also believe that the biblical tradition is to be understood by us in non-
religious terms. As Dietrich Bonhoeffer proposed: "Man's religiosity makes him look in
his distress to the power of God in the world: God is deus ex machina. The bible
directs man to God's powerlessness and suffering; only the suffering God can help." D.
BONHOEFFER, LETTERS AND PAPERS FROM PRISON 197 (E. Bethge ed. 1967). A deus ex
machina is the ally of nuclear weaponry; the suffering God is the ally of its victims.
(My own attempts at a theological understanding of law, first addressed in M. BALL,
THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LAW (1981), are the subject for continued exploration in
another book now in progress.)
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